

Series I
Correspondence,
1932-1973

Box 1, Folder 22

June 29, 1945 -
July 24, 1945

Frame: 0704

COMMANDER MOTOR TORPEDO BOAT SQUADRONS
PACIFIC FLEET
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

June 29, 1945

Dear Frog:

I didn't have a chance that last day at Leyte to discuss with you fully the manner in which USF 10B was designed, but I am going to lengths here to explain it, as you are one of the few who seem to have a deep interest in it.

The revision started about as follows. Apparently a communication had been addressed by CincPac to the Fleet asking for criticism of USF 10A. Most of the replies indicated very little thought on the subject, and many merely indicated that one of the examples given in the book was not properly solved. However, there were some good ideas submitted by the Fleet.

About this time I was detached from the Fleet and directed to report to Cincpac for duty. Upon reporting, Admiral Nimitz personally told me that he wished me to revise USF 10A. I thereupon studied all of the replies referred to above and then, from my own experience, as I had no assistance, rewrote USF 10A according to my concepts. I completely removed the whole Part on Fueling at Sea, which now is being put out as a separate publication.

Having completed my first rough draft, I sent it to Commander Battleships, Pacific Fleet (Admiral Lee), to Commander Air, Pacific Fleet (Admiral Pownall), and to Commander Destroyers, Pacific Fleet (Admiral Kauffman) for comment. Admiral Kauffman appointed a board of Captain Sol Philips and Captain Bottom, now Commodore Bottom, and Commander Brown, the A.S.W. officer, to go over the destroyer parts of it carefully, and the other parts of it generally. Admiral Pownall referred the AirPac copy to a board headed by Admiral Ginder and consisting, on occasions, of Admiral Sprague, and more particularly of Captain Fitzhugh Lee, as well as other officers. Admiral Lee did not reply, while I was at Pearl, but his Chief of Staff, Captain Jennings, told me that they had gone over my draft carefully and that a reply was forthcoming. Captain Jennings, however, knowing the recommendations of Admiral Lee, explained what Admiral Lee's objections were, and these objections were generally incorporated in a new rough draft. This corrected rough draft was then sent again to Commander Destroyers, Pacific and Commander Air, Pacific. Conferences were held with both by me. As a result, a new Part III, with particular reference to Screening, was drawn up which was approved by Commander Destroyers, Pacific. Commander Air, Pacific, on the other hand, decided to discuss his ideas with Admiral Mitscher, and Captain Lee was sent with the new book to Admiral Mitscher. As a result of this, Admiral Mitscher made some changes which were accepted and are incorporated in the present edition.

A new corrected draft was then sent to Admiral Spruance, where it was thoroughly studied by Admiral Davis, and to Admiral Halsey, where it was thorough-

0706

ly studied by his Staff. When I left Pearl in September, USF 10A had been reported by both Admiral Spruance and Admiral Halsey, and, in particular, by Admiral Halsey, as being excellent.

Every effort had been made by me to incorporate all of the lessons of the war to date in USF 10A, and all of the newer exercises had been incorporated in the Part on exercises so that, up until last September 1944, it was entirely up to date in this regard.

My greatest difficulty came with Part VI on Radar. This Part in the old USF 10A was definitely obsolete and belonged more in a C.I.C. manual than in a bridge manual. I, therefore, called in all of the Radar experts available, and this included the Radar School, Third Fleet, DesPac, ComPhiBSPac and others. As a result of a unified opinion, a new Part VI was drawn up which every Radar officer in the Fleet, both ashore and afloat, thought excellent. This new Part was then sent to Washington by officer messenger - Captain Horne - the communication officer for ComPhiBSPac (Admiral Turner). Washington accepted the general idea of the Part, but rewrote it themselves, and the present Part VI is more a product of Washington than of the Fleet.

I had begun to work on diagrams and to revise the diagrams now in the back of the book, but I was detached before I could do so. Meanwhile, however, I had started considerable agitation on the proper method of anti-aircraft defenses and had included in the ensuing discussions Admiral Wiltse, who commanded the Anti-aircraft Cruisers at that time - Admiral Lee - and ComCru and ComDesPac - Admiral Kauffman. I had forecast, at that time, that the anti-aircraft formations were not satisfactory and was endeavoring to develop something new. What Admiral Lee is now doing in the Atlantic, was being proposed by me at that time for the Pacific. In other words, I believe that tests must always be made before we accept new ideas in the Fleet.

Fortunately for me, about this time I was ordered to sea with Vice Admiral Oldendorf, where I felt I belonged. But, possibly unfortunately for USF 10A, I was detached and did not get a chance to finish the work I had started. So the work lay on the shelf in the Analytical Section at Pearl for months and gradually became somewhat obsolete as the months passed.

In the early spring of this year, Commodore Carter, the Operations Officer for Admiral Nimitz, and Vice Admiral McMorris, decided that something had better be done to bring USF 10A up to date. So a board was appointed, headed by Commodore Burke, who is Chief of Staff for Admiral Mitscher, and of two (2) other members, one of whom was a Captain Chandler, to go over my work and to put out a new Fleet suggestion for USF 10A. As a result of this board's work, a number of changes were made in my USF 10A, and particularly in Part III. I have only glanced at the new USF 10A, now called 10B, but in that glance I saw that it had been somewhat changed. Unfortunately there is no unanimity of opinion in the Destroyers concerning the best methods of operation and therefore the Destroyer Part on Screening will be changed as each Commander is changed. It seems to me that it would be wise to completely delete the present Part on Screening. This should be put out by Commander Destroyers with the instruction that, wherever practicable, his approved Screening plans would be used. As for myself, I do not recognize some of the Screening tables now in the book, and my only wish is that they are really effective.

I do not know how long Commodore Burke and his board worked on this USF 10A, but they worked long enough to make a number of changes, especially in Part III.

After the Burke Board had completed their work, the new book was - all of this is conjecture - sent by CincPac to Cominch as a recommendation. In Cominch it was in the hands of Admiral Delaney's Section, because they showed me a photographic copy of it when I was there and asked me to look over Commodore Burke's work to see what I thought of it. I told them that I realized that it was not entirely what I had drawn up, as there were changes made in it, but that I did not have time to look it over, as I had been sent to Washington by Admiral Nimitz on other matters. Captain Grannis said that his section had looked it over, and that it would be put out officially as USF 10B with any changes deemed necessary by Cominch. I received a letter from Captain Grannis the other day in which he said that it was now being issued for use of the Fleet and that Cominch thought it was a vast improvement over the old USF 10A.

I am telling you about this because I want you to see that so far as can be ascertained at this distance, the new USF 10B was designed from the best information available in the Fleet at the time, and it should be excellent now. I do not take full pride of authorship in it, although I had hoped that I would be able to do so, but the changes made by Commodore Burke's Board and by Cominch have modified it so that I cannot say that it is fully my work. In my short glance through it the other day, I noticed weaknesses, especially concerning suicide attacks, and I think that after Admiral Lee's Board has completed its work in the Atlantic that considerable changes in the Screening Dispositions will be in order.

I have gone to great lengths to explain the manner in which this book was drawn up so that you can view it from the broad picture, and, if you then still find it unsatisfactory, you may decide to make suitable representation concerning it. All I can say about it is this - that the USF 10A that I wrote, met with the entire approval of the Fleet as of last September, as it was in a major part drawn up with the help of the Fleet.

Yesterday the officers of the MONTPELIER, who said that they had made a study of it, stated to me that they thought it a vast improvement on USF 10A - in that it was realistic, and embraced the lessons of this war. Take it or leave it!

As you know, I am now on a new operation as an observer, and I find the situation quiet, and the operations proceeding reasonably satisfactory, I must confess however, that it is a little difficult for me to be an observer, and sit quiet and observe, but I am learning to do just this.

Best regards to you and congratulations again, on your beautiful command.

As ever, your old friend,

Rear Admiral Francis S. Low, USN
ComCruDiv 16
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

R. W. BATES
Commodore, USN

0708

CMTB/Pl6-1

c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Cal.

594

6 July 1945

My dear Scruggs,

I am in receipt of Bureau of Naval Personnel allowance letter Pers-2141-LN of 16 June 1945, in which you have established the officer allowance and complement for my staff. Evidently you based this allowance on the speed letter which I sent as of 4 June. This was quite a surprise to me as I thought that the speed letter plainly indicated that this request of mine was preliminary, and that I would probably ask for additional members of my staff later.

Your answer to this might be that I can request additional personnel at any time in the future if I find them necessary. This naturally is true but it is a slow process, and may result in my suffering severe hardship, while the request for additional personnel passes through the chain of command. I am about to submit one or two additional requests direct to you.

If you will study the Roster of Officers of MTB Rons SEVENTH Fleet you will find that it consists of 84 officers, all of whom Captain Bowling insists that he requires. The MTB Rons SEVENTH Fleet established staff is about 250 and Captain Bowling says that figure is inadequate. My enlisted staff is set at 63. It is my hope that I will not require anywhere near the personnel that Captain Bowling uses in the SEVENTH Fleet, because I plan to use a different organization.

For your information your new allowance calls for a Captain as Chief Staff Officer and a Commander as Operations Officer. I have now discovered that instead of a Captain I have been assigned a Commander, as my Chief Staff Officer, and instead of a Commander I have been assigned a Lieutenant Commander as my Operations Officer. It seems strange to me that the Bureau of Naval Personnel would set up an allowance only to have it immediately disregarded by another section of the same Bureau.

I know that you are very seriously up against it for personnel, and, therefore, I don't plan to ask for any more personnel than are absolutely necessary, as the facilities of these ships do not permit large staffs. However, I did suggest to Captain Bowling that, if certain competent members of his staff became available for transfer because of the reduction in the load in the Philippine area, I might ask for them as assistants in Operations, Intelligence and other divisions. I want to be sure that my requests in this connection meet with approval.

If you will look at the Roster of Officers of MTB Rons SEVENTH Fleet you will find that it has included in it eight or more Communication Officers, a Petroleum Officer, a Radio and Radar Officer, an Assistant to Ordnance

0709

6 July 1945

Officer, a Registered Publications Officer, an Assistant Personnel Officer, and Education Officer, a Public Relations Officer and a Postal Officer. I am not sure, as yet, whether I will need such officers, but Captain Bowling is satisfied that he needs them as well as about 50 others.

When I submitted my speed letter I did it from Guam with a hope that it would get early action and that someone would be sent out immediately to help me. So far I have received one officer and no enlisted personnel with the result that my staff today consists of one Lieutenant Commander, one Lieutenant (SC) and no enlisted personnel whatsoever. With this "large staff" I am endeavoring to operate the Motor Torpedo Boats Pacific.

I write this letter to you with the request that you will view my situation in a friendly light and will give me an opportunity at present to make changes in my staff without having to pass through a long chain of command. When I observe the Roster of Officers of Commander Motor Torpedo Boats, SEVENTH Fleet and when I consider that when the new organization is effective probably all the Torpedo Boats will come under my operational command, as well as type, I have doubts that I will be able to operate them with such a small staff, both officer and enlisted personnel, as you now propose.

Very sincerely yours,

R.W. BATES.

Captain R.M. Scruggs,
Bureau of Naval Personnel,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

0710

(Pers)

c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.

604

9 July 1945

Dear H.T. -

I was quite interested to receive your letter relative to mine on the Holland. It was generous and quite typical of you. Thanks!

Your favorable action towards getting quarters on the ACONTIUS for officers and men of the staff is appreciated very much by everyone. The proposed quarters for me in the after part of the ship were not much but I was willing to accept them in order to meet my RFS date. I had hopes that something was in the air!

Frankly your delay will be very helpful in a training way. As yet, despite requests to competent authority, I have received only four staff officers - Chief Staff Officer - Operations Officer - Aerological Officer and Supply Officer. The rest may take several months in getting here as their orders are not via air and no priority is granted. I have received no enlisted men whatsoever.

It is my hope that sufficient personnel will arrive during our stay here to permit them to work for a time with those members on the staff of COMMTHRONs SEVENTH Fleet so that they may get the hang of their jobs.

Captain Gold probably told you that the ACONTIUS is not well suited for a flagship but the changes which you have approved will go a long way toward improving the set-up.

I am getting more pleased with my job every day.

Best to you, old friend.

As ever,

Yours,

Rear Admiral H. T. Smith, U.S.N.,
Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet,
Advance Headquarters,
c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.

0711

ComMTRonsPacFleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

12 July 1945.

Dear Mary:

That letter from you was highly interesting. I am glad that they seem to be moving you north then south - Brooklyn to Newport to Argentia to the Solomons. Then they can start moving you west and, after a while, you will be able to see me - or I you, as you will.

No, I know nothing of Caroline's activities. I am, and always shall be, very fond of her, and I have advised her on more than one occasion, but I know nothing of her present affair at Rene. It is true that I did not favor this marriage, and said so because it seemed foolish and based on nothing. However, it was her life - not mine - and if she chose to act that way it was her privilege. She is a swell girl and one, I think, marvelously beautiful. But, in opposition, she has had a hard time; too hard, in fact, and very difficult to bear. I shall always admire her courage.

I'm not dripping with ribbons. I have won in this war one Navy Cross and two Legions of Merit as honors and I have garnered a few campaign ribbons - all of which add up. I'm glad that I am here!

I used to talk to Admiral Oldendorf about you, and he said that at Argentia you were just as devastating as you were at Newport. I didn't know that you had been divorced! Why do you hide such matters when I'm around?

Best to you and to Frannie whom I always liked. If you write to Caroline say "hello" for me as I don't know her address.

Congratulations on your rank! If you keep on advancing as fast as you have you will soon catch me! Think of it, a Lieutenant already!

Thanks for your note!

Very sincerely,

Lieut. M. Behan (NNC), USN
U.S. Naval Mine Warfare Test Station
Solomons, Maryland

0712

ComMTBRonsPacFleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

12 July 1945.

Dear Captain Parker:

Thanks very much for your note relative to my advancement to Commodore. I enjoyed it, particularly from you. However, I'm disappointed that you did not get such advancement also. I have talked you up, on more than one occasion, where it would do the most good, but it didn't seem to work. Perhaps later we can, by voice of public opinion, force a recognition long delayed.

I read your analysis of the October battles and, as a whole, it is excellent. I can point out mistakes in our action but it is not the fault of your office - reports are, as you say, not clear. One of these days I will open up and point out where I think the information and discussion could be changed. You are excellent in this type of work.

I have seen Admiral Shaferth on several occasions and he is doing very well indeed. Admiral Clark told me that he had recommended him for Vice-Admiral. I should certainly like to see him get it.

USF 10 B is out now and to my satisfaction it is almost exactly what I wrote. Part III - destroyer screens - is about the only change. I have asked a number of officers how they like it. On the plus side I have: ComBatDiv 3, ComBatDiv 4, ComCruDiv 5, ComCruDiv 12, Montpelier, Columbia, Idaho, and HMAS Shropshire. On the negative side I have: ComCruDiv 16 (Low). The Commodore's staff on the Shropshire were highly commendatory, said it had cleared up all confusion, and was much admired. So perhaps those three months in your office were not wasted after all.

As for ComCruDiv 16, he simply is a grouser; his complaints were not too serious, and he seems to have forgotten them. Frankly, there must always be, especially in the Navy, His Majesty's loyal opposition. As for myself, I had not expected to hear such favorable comments. As the book was drawn up last summer, the fact that it meets approbation today, is surprising. Perhaps the expression "he builded better than he knew", suits my case.

I was glad to be recognized even as a Commodore! The Admirals in selection are as fair as they can be and, if I don't make it, it must be my own fault. I am an opinionated cuss, I suppose, and I speak out; which, perhaps, is not good naval usage. I always remember that Admiral Niblack, in his "Letters of a Retired Rear-Admiral to his Son" said, "You ask me if the Navy pays. I say that if you have ideas of your own, if you are individual in thought," (or words to that effect) "perhaps not".

0713

Well, the Navy has "paid" me. I wouldn't have given up my years in the Navy for anything, promoted or not!

My new job is swell and will be more so. I have a remarkably game bunch of young men who are itching to go.

Many thanks for your interest in me. Also many thanks for your help at Pearl in my book. If you hadn't been so helpful the book might not have been spoken of so highly.

Keep well! Get a star *. Keep on active duty. As ever,

Your old "office pal"

R. W. BATES.

Captain R. C. Parker, USN
CinCPac
c/o F.P.O., San Francisco, Calif.

0714

Commodore Pacific Fleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

14 July 1945.

My dear Mathis:

It was very nice of you and your staff to remember me, and to write me that letter about my advancement to Commodore. I appreciated your thoughts very much; just as much, in fact, as I appreciated the privilege, two and a half years ago, of appearing before your school to discuss Intelligence.

Your school has done very well, and it appears that a large number of your Intelligence graduates are, as you say, operating in the Motor Torpedo Boat Squadrons. As a matter of interest, these officers are not really operating as Intelligence officers but are, instead, operating as Operations officers with a bit of Intelligence thrown in. The reason for this seems to be a peculiar one, and yet a commendatory one to your school. There are so few officers trained in staff work that when one is found he becomes extremely valuable. It is my belief that what happened in the Motor Torpedo Boat Squadrons 7th Fleet is this: your Intelligence School graduates were placed on the staffs of the squadron commanders, and immediately were found valuable. They were found so valuable, in fact, that the squadron commanders relied upon them fully, and gave them more jobs to do than an Intelligence Officer, properly, should concern himself with. An Intelligence Officer should do only Intelligence work. Out here I find that the Intelligence Officers are doing a great duty as what are called Operational Intelligence Officers, and are, in part, responsible for the success of the 7th Fleet Motor Torpedo Boat Operations. You can feel quite proud of your share in this effort.

In view of the fact that your Intelligence graduates are doing so much Operational work as well, it might be a wise thing to give them a little Operational training - that is, on how Operation plans are drawn up, and what analysis goes into it - so that they may be even more valuable, should they be assigned similar duties. I hope, in the Pacific Fleet, to be able to give the Intelligence Officers more Intelligence than Operational work, but it is a little difficult to make changes and I may have to go along, at least for a while, with the present methods.

Thank you very much for all of your attention to me and for your thoughtfulness during my lecture periods there at your headquarters. No one could have been nicer, and no one could have

(1)

0715

received more comprehensive attention than I received from your students. They were so interested and so anxious to know what had occurred in the Pacific, as well as how to think, that I sometimes think that I may have said a little more than I should have.

With warmest personal regards to you, and congratulations on your success, I am as ever,

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES.
Commodore, USN

Lieut. Comdr. John H. Mathis
Advanced Naval Intelligence School
350 W. 57th St., New York, 19, N. Y.

ComMTRonsPacFleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California
14 July 1945.

Dear Admiral:

That was a very nice letter which you wrote me, and I appreciated receiving it quite a lot. I was especially interested in hearing from you because a number of your ships are in the gulf here, and I have seen them daily with a sort of pang in my heart.

I had lunch with McCormick the other day, and with Captain Grassie, and it was a lot of fun. Then, later, I went over to the Officer's Club, and there I met Sewell and Low and many others. They told me what you were doing up there, but indicated that it was more or less confidential.

I think your comment is right about selection, and when I do discuss it, it is, I hope, never about me, nor brought up by me. It is always brought up by others. My conversation with Vice-Admiral Heever was brought up by him entirely, and I could not very well refuse to discuss it with him. Frog Lew discussed it with me the other day. In no case have I talked about myself. Lew said that he was astenished to find that what I had said before was true - that no one in your command, or in the old cruisers, or even the new cruisers, with the exceptions of Wright and Berkoy, had been advanced to Rear-Admiral since June 1943. He said that it was too bad and that, apparently, they had handled the situation wrong in Washington. I could tell you a lot about this, but I will wait until I see you. I don't want to discuss the matter any more and, frankly, I tell them so. The Fleet Inspector (Medical), Rear-Admiral Lanning, Medical Corps, wanted to discuss the matter with me the other day because he is angry about the viewpoint of one of his sons who wants to get out after the war because he says that selection isn't fair and offers no future. This son is a Commander and has done well. In my new job there isn't anyone to discuss the subject with and, therefore, I am fully able to give my entire time towards the reorganization of my command. However, I want you to know that I think that you are right in your recommendation to me and I shall continue following it out.

I don't know why somebody opened that letter at ComPhibsGroup9. I have no idea why it was opened and I presume it must have been a mistake. If I get a chance I will look into it, although it can not be very serious.

USF 10 B is now out in the fleet, as you, perhaps know, as it became effective 1 July. I have had a chance to look it over, and I find that it is almost exactly what I wrote. Some of the instructions concerning the handling of destroyer screens has been changed, but, as a whole, the book is mine. So, if you like it you can say "Well done," and if you don't like it you know who to bawl out. I have been interested as to its success in the fleet, and I have so far been told as follows - on the plus side, by ComBat-Div3, ComBatDiv4, ComCruDiv5, ComCruDiv12, Montpelier, Columbia, Salt Lake City, Idaho, and HMAS Shropshire (Staff of Commodore Farncomb) that it was

0717

excellent and cleared up every one of the terrible confusions which had existed in USF 10 A. On the negative side I received criticism from ComCruDiv16 (Low), who had criticisms about it relative to the Radar Part for one thing and to some other Part for another. However, the other officers, when he started complaining, told him to "shut up" as they thought it was excellent.

I was glad to hear that you had made the changes that you referred to in your staff. I knew that Commander Wood would be unsatisfactory, and I had hopes that Captain Geeper would prove far more satisfactory than Admiral Deyo wished to admit. It was for that reason that I blocked Admiral Deyo from requesting his detachment by dispatch, but what sort of fitness report Admiral Deyo wrote him, I do not know. He is hard working and conscientious and thoroughly loyal. Frankly, I like him.

I know absolutely nothing about Dencho. I knew that he was a good submarine man, but, evidently, submarines did not want to keep him longer, now that he has reached Captain rank. His classmates say that he is smart but not sufficiently qualified to be your Operations Officer. However, you will be the best judge of that!

I am awfully sorry that you have lost Sullivan as he is a most devoted and loyal supporter of yourself as well as of mine. He is a natural politician, as are most Irishmen, and will do well and make friends wherever he goes.

I have been wondering about the Major. I remember that he put in a request for a course in Law which he much preferred to have, than to be placed at some Marine post in the States, and I know that you forwarded his request approved. I am afraid that, in a very short time, you will lose him also. Should you lose Duffy, the old team which carried through so long will have finally evaporated, which will be too bad.

I went down to Operation OBOE 2, the other day, and stayed there a week. Compared to the Operations which you used to run, it was, of course, small potatoes. There was practically no air opposition of any kind, and the beach landing was affected without casualty. The forces landed were relatively small, and the forces used for softening the place were also relatively small. However, as you have noted from dispatches, there was more difficulty with mines there than elsewhere, because of the difficulties encountered by the minesweepers in sweeping. The under water boys did a fine job. As most of the Bombardment and Fire Support group had been trained under you, I know that you will be glad to hear that they are doing well in this area. I was asked to go aboard the flagship of the Officer in Command of the pre D-Day Operations, and he discussed with me very carefully what had occurred each day. Having been trained under you, I was able to help him out, I think, quite a lot. However, I wouldn't want this to be mentioned anywhere else than here.

I am converting one of my tenders into a flagship, and the work is pregressing favorably. I had hoped to be up there to see you in my flagship

pretty soon, but the powers that be delayed so long in authorizing the conversion, that I am also delayed.

Once again I want to say how much I, also, wish that they had kept our combination intact; although, as Captain Parker said in a memorandum to me "The finishing touches on the chances of real gun fighting were put on in Surigao Strait and the loss of the Yamato clinched the matter". He seems to think that "from now on the heavy gun boys have little to look forward to except bombardment missions with the constant likelihood of getting a Kamikaze in the back of the neck". I am afraid that he is correct and that your work, rather than being the highly interesting work it was, may now become sort of hum-drum, although, when the Kamikazes are around, I must confess that I never thought the life hum-drum at that time.

In answer to your P.S., I want you to know that I did not filch or otherwise abstract your night order book covering night orders for the nights of October 24 - 25. However, I have it in my box, and one of these days I will send it to you. I gave it to Commander Morrison, the Naval Historian, to read and he returned it when I was leaving, and it stowed in the box. What he has taken out of it, I do not know because he never told me. He was, however, interested in the fact that the possibility of the Japanese movement through San Bernardino and Surigao Straits had already been estimated by CTG 77.2.

I went to the funeral of Admiral Royal. It was too bad that he had to die just after he had succeeded in completing successfully the Brunei Operations. The funeral was held ashore here and was well done, although no funeral is really pleasant, is it.

With warmest regards to you and to the staff, I am as ever,

Yours sincerely,

R. W. BATES

Vice Admiral J. B. Oldendorf
ComBatRonONE
c/o FPO, San Francisco, Calif.

ComINTERSPacFleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

15 July 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Commodore Carter.

1. The officer who is delivering you this letter is my new Operations Officer, Lieutenant Commander Bente. He is a graduate of a recent class in the Naval War College, and is a former squadron commander and captain of a PT boat. You may ask him anything you wish, and I think that he will be able to give you a reasonable answer.
2. I am sending him to Okinawa, providing, of course, that it meets with your approval. I have a squadron up there, number 31, which is not giving me enough information concerning its activities. I think that the Squadron Commander has a few more grandiose ideas concerning future operations than, in fact, exist, and, as he is an operator, I can not tell him too much. The name of the Squadron Commander is Searles, and he is reputedly a good fighting man, but he has been on his own a little too long.
3. I desire Lieutenant Commander Bente to look over the prospective areas for a PT base, which areas have already been examined by a board consisting of certain fairly senior officers on Okinawa. From reports, every one seems quite favorable to Shana Wan. At the present moment I have permission from Admiral Sharp to use the Mine Anchorage at Unten Ko, but, unfortunately, although when he was at Guam he said I could use it without any restriction, he now seems to feel compressed and is, apparently, reluctant to embrace all of the forces which I will bring there. Shana Wan is reported excellent for my purposes with the exception of the fact that there is a bar over the entrance, which must be cleared out. How long it will take to clear out this bar, I do not know, but I have heard rumors that it may take thirty days. Admiral Getter was thoroughly in favor of Shana Wan when I last saw him at Guam, and told me that he liked it so much that he would like to have a chance to establish quarters there for himself. I, naturally, thoroughly concurred in this wish. I am going to have Lieutenant Commander Bente see Captain Painter (CEC), as well as the proper authorities on Okinawa, concerning the dredging of Shana Wan, as I am quite anxious to get my people established in their own bailiwick. Anything that you can do to push this along will be appreciated by me.
4. I have directed Lieutenant Commander Bente to discuss with you certain matters with relation to bases. I don't know where, when, or in what size the bases that you plan to establish farther north will be. I noted the other day a dispatch relative to establishing a base for one squadron only at Okinawa. The dispatch said, further, that the materials available, not required, were to be given to those units which could use them best. For your information, there are here now, at Samar - Base 17 -

0720

two E11 units, each of which will handle two squadrons comfortably. These units have been sent out from the States and are thoroughly complete, including the personnel, which number about 115 men. The equipment of an E11 base includes many vital items which are not readily obtainable elsewhere. There is some doubt here as to whether these E11 units belong to PacFleet or to 7th Fleet, but the chances are, at present, that they belong to 7th Fleet. Should they belong to Pac Fleet, I must request that, for the sake of the logistics of the forthcoming operations, these two units be held intact until it is definitely determined that they will not be required. There are six E21 units available in the 7th Fleet which are much smaller units and which can handle one squadron, temporarily, reasonably well. The 7th Fleet has offered any of these to me that I wish as they have no need for them now. In this connection, the 7th Fleet has built many bases and has operated almost entirely from bases. PacFleet, on the other hand, in future operations, will be operating more from tenders than from bases. At least, that is my understanding, and my personnel are being so instructed. Actually, complete dependence on tenders is not considered fully satisfactory, as there must be places to stow your spare material - to handle your additional base personnel which is part of a PT squadron, and to handle other important matters which arise from time to time.

5. I saw Admiral Kincaid the other day, and had quite a talk with him concerning PT boats, and I can assure you that he is quite convinced of their value. He says that PTs and air are solely responsible for the success of the New Guinea campaign, in that they starved the Japanese out. He also spoke well of them, but not so highly, for the Philippine campaign. This was because there was less opposition to the PT boats in the Philippines than in New Guinea. Of course, the PT boats at Surigao did give some valuable information, and they did get in serious fights at Ormoc and Mindoro, but, compared with the New Guinea campaign, they didn't have quite the job to do. Admiral Kincaid told me that he thought it best to make no recommendations concerning the possible placing in reserve of PT squadrons which might appear in excess, until after the next operation had indicated that such a move would be correct. He said he did not know how many PT boats would be required, but if they were able to operate in the north as well as they had in the Philippines and New Guinea, he thought there would be a use for many. Unless I hear to the contrary, I am acting on that basis.

6. MTRons7thFleet is studying the situation here for the purpose of transferring to MTRonsPacFleet a certain number of PT boats and tenders in accordance with their dispatch to you some time ago. Judging from my discussions with them, I think that they are doing their best to give us good squadrons, but, naturally, not all of their best squadrons will be transferred, as some of them are still in combat. I should like to make a recommendation concerning the handling of these squadrons as they are turned over, but as the final, future plans are not, insofar as I am concerned, concrete, I am making no recommendations now. Perhaps you can tell Lieutenant Commander Bonte some of your thoughts in this matter.

0721

7. As you know, two PT squadrons will be transferred north this month, making a total of three PT squadrons and two LST type tenders at Okinawa by 1 August, I guess. I am getting another squadron here from the East coast, Squadron 39, which is partially here now, and I find it to be an excellent squadron, and one with much later equipment than the others have. It is fully equipped with rockets, with the Mark 9 - 37mm gun, and with the SO3 Radar. This squadron should be ready for moving forward in early August, and I hope that you will view its transference north with favor. If we assume that at the start we will use three squadrons, there should be a fourth in reserve. However, it is my opinion that after Admiral Turner and Admiral Kincaid get through with their plans, more PTs may be required than have been originally assigned. At least, Admiral Kincaid's comments to me would so indicate.

8. I was sorry that the Acontius could not be prepared as a flagship in the time allotted, but I was willing to do anything if you had need of me at that moment, and that was why I sent that message to Captain Gold, which you probably read. The Acontius is a good ship, and I believe a good tender, but she has not been well designed and, therefore, it becomes a difficult job to convert her to a flagship. Things are progressing very rapidly on her, though, and, perhaps, we can beat the date - at least I am trying to but it is quite possible that the lack of equipment, such as tables, chairs, and even an evaporator, may adversely effect this desire.

9. I went down to Operation Oboe 2 and I was very glad to go. The Operation was quite a simple one, compared to the very large operations which were conducted by Oldendorf and, to a lesser degree, by Deyo. However, it was very similar to those which we used to do in the Pacific, and, had it not been for the difficulties with the mine-sweepers, owing to Allied mines, the job would and could have been very simple. Our troops landed without any fire at all. I followed the landing craft toward the beach in a PT boat and was heavily attacked with three inch anti-aircraft shells which burst all around me, and I rapidly cleared the line of fire. The enemy shells did not pursue me, so to clear the line of fire was easy. I discovered later that the fire came from caves on the left side of the beach and about 5,000 yards away. I followed the PT Operations quite closely at Oboe 2. PTs were used to patrol the beaches to the north and to the south of the landing to prevent enemy PT boats from coming out, and they were used across Macassar Strait to report any enemy ships which might be proceeding north. As a whole, they did what they were supposed to do effectively, but the patrols were all negative, at least while I was there.

10. The plane that was to pick me up on 3 July cracked up on landing, owing to the roughness of the sea, so I came up with Com7th Fleet in HMAS Shropshire, as a guest of Commodore Farncomb. The whole trip

was very pleasant but I had to get off at Tawi Tawi, and proceed north by seaplane, which latter trip was uneventful. The Australians said that they were glad to celebrate Fourth of July with us because it celebrated the date when the British Empire gained its independence from the United States. I told the Aussies that, as our independence was twelve years before Australia was settled, I thought they could celebrate either way, without having any feelings in the matter whatsoever.

11. Any information that you can give Lieutenant Commander Bonte, I should appreciate very much indeed, as over here I am completely in the dark and so is every one else, more or less. Admiral Kincaid's planners are trying to beat the game by roughly estimating what the plans will be and preparing in advance drafts which can be straightened out to fit the situation. I did not go into this with them too fully, although Admiral Kincaid did not seem reluctant to let certain information out as it was necessary for planning.

12. I should see Admiral Turner to see what he plans to use my PTs for, so that I may draw up my own plans, and may prepare a training plan along the lines which he indicates.

13. Thanks very much for everything you have done for me and for your thoughtful interest in my behalf.

R. W. BATES

Commodore J. B. Carter, USN,
CinCPac,
Advanced Headquarters,
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.

(4)

0723

ComUSPacFleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.

18 July 1945.

Dear Eddie:

It was very nice to see you down there at Obos 2, and I was quite pleased to see that you were looking so well, and so thoroughly enjoying your job. Chief of Staff to an Amphibious Group Command is a very serious responsibility, particularly as regards planning, although, generally, if the Bombardment and Fire Support Group have done their duty, the landing can be effected without too serious a loss. This may not obtain for our next major operation, but it is the lesson of practically every operation to date.

I noted that your operation down there seems to have been well figured out and that everything went along as smoothly as could be. Such a condition does not always obtain. They were telling me about an operation the other day - a small one in the Solomons area - wherein there was no preliminary bombardment, and the troops were landed in an area where the Japs were very weak. You can imagine the consternation of all hands when they suddenly discovered that they were under heavy enemy fire, and it is my understanding that a retirement was forced. This shows that Intelligence, as I have so often maintained, is an enormously vital cog in any amphibious plan, and I can not stress too strongly to anyone doing amphibious planning, the necessity for a thorough study of their intelligence. This study is to be made not only to find where the enemy's stuff is most probably located, but also to insure that it is given proper weight. A lot of it may be valueless, and plans based upon valueless information, may be infinitely worse than if they had been based upon no information at all. If you will remember, in our famous operation in Luzon, our intelligence was almost entirely incorrect. In my mental planning, beforehand, and in my discussions with Admiral Oldendorf, and most certainly with Admiral Kincaid, I stressed the point that the Intelligence seemed doubtful. If you will remember, I wrote a memorandum, for Admiral Oldendorf's signature, to Admiral Kincaid, pointing out that the Intelligence seemed to be in error and that we would encounter heavy air power. The 7th Fleet persisted in believing their Intelligence, but in so doing they merely trusted a bent reed. No one knows better than you do the strength of the enemy air that we encountered at that time.

You couldn't have been kinder to me down there than you were, and I appreciated all the courtesies you and Admiral Noble extended to me. I should have liked to have remained a little longer and to have gone

(1)

0724

ashore on the beach to see if the sand in that area is any different than the sand in other areas. However, I couldn't do it as I had to get up here at a definite time.

Our trip on the Shropshire was swell. Both Bowling and I thoroughly enjoyed it, and Commodore Farncomb could not have been more thoughtful. Everything that was possible was done to make our trip a pleasant one, and I was very happy that either you or Admiral Noble made that suggestion about the Shropshire. I note that Commodore Farncomb has been made a Commander of the Bath, which, they say, was for the Lingayen Operation. If you will remember, we recommended him for a Navy Cross, and it is my belief that our recommendation went through to Washington where it was turned over to the British representatives who, in turn, awarded him the CB instead of our giving him an American decoration. This is merely a presumption but it seems logical. Likewise, Captain Nichols of the Shropshire was given a DSO for Surigao. This was also a recommendation of ours which went through the same channels as did Commodore Farncomb's. I am glad to see that such recognition was accorded these gentlemen as they put up a noble fight with rather weak material.

Things are going along reasonably well with me. I am studying this new job and believe that I am gradually getting the hang of it. It is an entirely new picture, as you can imagine, from the work we were all doing; handling battleships, cruisers, destroyers, aircraft carriers, minesweepers, and under water teams, but when the whole Pacific is concerned, it becomes a very important and powerful command. The only fly in the ointment is that PT boats are a most specialized type of weapon, and commanders have to be educated to their capabilities and limitations. In SouPac and SouWesPac, because of the shortage of more powerful ships and because of the need for a specialized type of ship similar to the PTs, they enjoyed a market all their own, and did very well indeed. In the Central and Northern Pacific they are practically unknown, and I am not too sure yet that they will be used in great strength in that area. This is because the northern areas have a great many ships of great power and they are better able to stand the sea than the PT boats are. If the weather conditions in the north are good, I think that the PT boats will distinguish themselves as usual. If the weather conditions are bad, the PT boats may have difficulty in operating, as they did off Lingayen.

Please give my very warmest regards to Admiral Noble, and
as for myself, you always have my deep respect and admiration.

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES

Captain Edward A. Solomons, USN
Chief of Staff
ComPhibsGroupEIGHT
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

0726

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ComMTRonsPacFleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

20 July 1945.

Dear Admiral Van Hook:

This is merely a note to thank you for your kindness, and Admiral Coombs' kindness, in allowing me to stay for a few days in your headquarters at Tolosa. I certainly appreciated it as I really had no suitable place to go.

I am living over in Samar now, temporarily, while my flagship, the Acontius, is undergoing conversion into a flagship alongside a tender in Leyte Harbor. I am living in the new quarters which Captain Bowling built for visiting firemen.

As regards the question of the quarters that Admiral Davis had at Tolosa, that matter was a little confused. I sent a dispatch from CinCPac Advanced, at their direction, to 7th Fleet asking if the quarters formerly occupied by Admiral Davis, were available. You did reply, I now discover, but CinCPac, who was guarding my circuit for me, as I was working on an Estimate of the Situation for Admiral Nimitz, apparently either missed the message entirely or failed to give it to me or to Commodore Carter, CinCPac Operations Officer. Up to the time I left Guam for Leyte, there, apparently, had been no reply. I wasn't sure that I would get the quarters, but I thought, and I am quite sure that Commodore Carter at CinCPac thought, that it was possibly available. Unfortunately, it was not. However, despite this, my short stay in the other quarters which you assigned me was very happy and helpful to me, as I was able to get together with your Staff and reorient myself into an entirely new field.

Captain Bowling and his Staff have been very kind in discussing very freely all matters connected with PT boats with me, and I am finding out a lot about them that I didn't know before, although I suspected certain frailties and appreciated certain strengths. I am endeavoring to absorb all about PT boats, including the mental process which makes them click.

I have always told my people, as well as the staffs with which I have been associated, that if any man lost his life through some mistake or error in judgement or failure of any one of them, that might have been foreseen, I would never forgive them or myself. Naturally, such a stand pays dividends in the end, but, at first, it is hard on officers, in particular, who are forced to go through a sound mental process instead of being allowed to make hap-hazard decisions. In my mind the naval system teaches our officers to be doers - excellent doers - but not thinkers. Thinkers and doers are very rare! And when we find a thinker and a doer, we make a High Commander out of him, as has been done in the case of Admiral Kincaid.

(1)

0727


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Those clubs which you have established for the Fleet over at Macarata, Osmana, Samar, are the finest clubs that I have seen in the whole Pacific, and I am not excepting Pearl. They are very popular and well run. I should say that the Pacific Fleet has a lot to learn about clubs from the 7th Fleet.

May I thank you again for your kindness and indulgence to me, and may I also say, for Vice-Admiral Oldendorf and myself, that we appreciated, more than you can really understand, the prompt manner with which you facilitated the awards to our ships whenever submitted. Naturally, we realize that we are not in the war for awards but to bring victory at minimum cost and in minimum time. However, there is a place for awards and it is nice to see that place so quickly filled.

As I told you before, when I was at Tolosa, I expect to see three stars on your collar before you go home. If I don't, I shall be even more disappointed than you are. With warmest personal regards to you and to the others there, and with deep appreciation of your courtesies to me, I am as ever,

Very sincerely yours,



R. W. BATES

Rear-Admiral C. E. Van Hook, USN
Commander Seventh Fleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

0728

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ComMTBRonsPacFleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California
21 July 1945.

My Dear Commander Warfield:

It has come to my attention that a most peculiar situation, deleterious to discipline, is developing within the PT Boat Command. I find that there is a tendency on the part of officers attached to the highest Motor Torpedo Boat Staffs to write letters back and forth concerning the assignment of officers to staffs without any reference, whatsoever, to the wishes of the Commander, and without any consideration of secrecy. This is because there is a lack of understanding of the principle of the chain of command.

I have told my officers that I disapprove of communications between them and you, or the Navy Department, concerning members of my Staff or concerning any matters connected with the Operations in the Pacific, which properly belong to me as the Commander, without first consulting me. The reasons are obvious.

Very frankly, I don't know anyone on my Staff who is being sent out here by the Department, and it is my hope that they are the best officers that are available. But I have already heard, indirectly, through one of those obnoxious letters referred to in the first paragraph which was from an officer in the Navy Department to an officer on MTBRons7thFleet Staff, and which named the principal members of my Staff, that some of them were considered rather weak. Whom these officers referred to are, I do not as yet know but, if the above is true, I will find out soon enough. However, in so doing, a considerable amount of time and valuable effort will have been wasted, and the National Effort will have suffered as regards PTs Pacific.

Out in this area there is available excellent information concerning the capabilities of most officers of the PT Fleet, and had the recommendations been sent to me, I might well have asked Captain Bowling to assist me in selecting my Staff. In fact, he had already advised me concerning the Chief Staff Officer, the Operations Officer, and the Logistics Officer, only one of whom was accepted by the Bureau of Naval Personnel. However, I realize that you have, perhaps, nothing to do with the final selections.

Your Training Command and MTBRonsPacFleet should be closely allied, and I am anxious that it shall be so. However, it must never be forgotten that the Training Command exists for the Fleet and not vice versa.

R. W. Bates

R. W. BATES
Commodore, USN

Commander T. G. Warfield, USN
MTBSTDC, Melville, R. I.

0729

ComMTRonsPacFleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.

23 July 1945.

Dear Tappaan:

I am a little late in writing this letter to you, but I want to thank you for the efforts you took in explaining to me your plan of Operations for Oboe 2. I have told Captain Bowling of how well you were doing there, and I think everyone in the High Command is well satisfied with your performance. Your work indicates that an All American has qualities which are of value in war as well as on the football field.

I noted your orders with regret, because I had hopes that, perhaps, I might be able to convince Washington that you would be useful in the operations in the North. However, I know that you wish to get back to the States again, and I realize that, having been away from your family a long time, a "get together" is due.

Please tell the Skipper of your tender that his courtesy to me was very much appreciated. I could not have been better handled, and I enjoyed my stay. He didn't have the beer or whiskey which was discovered on the SHROPSHIRE but, otherwise, his ship was "tops".

Let me wish you all success in your duty in Washington, and here's hoping that, while there, you won't forget us out here!

Best regards. As always,

Very sincerely yours,

RWB

R. W. BATES

Lieut. Comdr. F. D. Tappaan, USNR,
U.S.S. CYRENE (AGP-13),
c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.

0730

ComTBRRonsPacFleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.

23 July 1945.

Dear Bill:

I note that a number of the officers being assigned to my Staff are of less rank than that authorized in the Staff Allowance. I hope that these officers will not be given "spot promotions" to the allowed rank at this time, as I feel that such promotions within a staff are conducive to friction and jealousy. I feel confident that you concur with me.

"Count" Berkey came through here the other day and looked me up. Unfortunately, I missed him. He has done well and I, for one, have been quite proud of him. Rumor hath it that he is heading for a new assignment. You would know!

I understand that T. Keliher is out here but I haven't seen him. He is a good man and I was glad to see that you were able to look out for him, even though not to the extent that you, personally, would have wished.

I suppose that you are even hotter there than we are in your old area. Best regards. As always,

Very sincerely yours,



R. W. BATES

Rear-Admiral Wm. M. Fechteler, USN
Bureau of Naval Personnel
Navy Department
Washington, 25, D. C.

0731

ComMTEBonsPacFleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

24 July 1945.

Dear Old Swede:

I received a parcel from you today which enclosed one vizor for my hat and enough gold braid for two blue uniforms. It also had two suits of white pyjamas. I can not thank you too much for your kindness in doing this for me as I know that you are quite busy. I hope that if you get a chance you will purchase me another vizor, for which I will be very grateful.

I hope that my limited check did not offend you, but as I have lost a considerable amount of mail, and have lost presents which have been sent to me months back, I was reluctant to allow a check with an unlimited figure on it to go through the mails and possibly get lost en route. I know that you know that the figure "not over \$50" was in no way meant to incur your wrath.

I am finding my new assignment quite interesting, and I can see that I am to have a large command. I find everyone associated with it of very high character, and the officers and men represent the best there is in young America. My only hope now is that I will be allowed to use them in strength against the enemy. As you well know, the Central Pacific has practically never seen a PT boat excepting the few at Pearl which are of an obsolete type, and which are not very highly considered here. This is no criticism of Gamble and his men, but is, rather, a criticism of the design. As time goes on, if the situation permits, I will endeavor to transfer to you a more modern outfit so that you may train your ships with the best there is.

I miss you very much out here! As you know, I have always had an exceptionnally high regard for you and for your abilities. I have heard many very high ranking officers extol you and express their disappointment that you haven't as yet received an additional star. Naturally, you know that I have always felt you were entitled to it, and I know that when we were in Washington, both Admiral Oldendorf and I did all that we could for you. In fact, I have always felt that we did more for you than for me, but we were not quite effective enough in either case. I don't know what it is all about, and I hadn't planned to discuss it in this letter, but I want you to know that, no matter what you do, you have the admiration and respect of all of your colleagues in the service.

I hope that you are liking your new job. It keeps you on shore there in the Hawaiian area, which is not to your liking, I know, but it is in the Pacific which, after all, is where the fighting is. I was awfully glad when Admiral Nimitz gave me this assignment - or was it BuPers - because I am the last person in the world who should be taken out of the combat areas and sent home. I have been out here over two

(1)

0732

years now and it just seems as though I left the coast yesterday, and I don't care if I don't see it again for a long time. I want the war to end decisively as soon as possible, and after that I shall be ready to return. We, of the regular Navy, I think, prefer to be in the combat areas and I think that the Reserves, as a whole, prefer to be home. This is not any criticism of the Reserves who, in the end, have done most of the fighting, and damned good fighting, as you know, but the Navy is not their life for the future. If it were, they would have entered the Navy long ago. Instead, what they desire is home, family, and peace.

I was very distressed to hear, and it now seems to have been verified, that your beloved daughter lost her husband in Okinawa. If it be true, it is a most bitter disappointment to me because I never did have the pleasure of seeing your son-in-law and, through several mix-ups in mail, I never even sent a wedding present to the daughter of the man I consider one of my best, if not my best, friends. It seems a remarkable thing that the two young girls who grew to womanhood so splendidly, and who reflect the finest there is in young womanhood, should have both lost their husbands in this war within but a short time after their marriage. I refer, naturally, to little Teddy Chandler and your own beloved Emily. If you get a chance, please drop me a line giving me young Emily's address, and if you think it wise, I should like to drop her a note to tell her how badly I feel about this. I know how deeply you feel.


I cannot understand why you should have had to suffer the many bitter disappointments that have been yours recently. However, the way of the Creator is unfathomable, and we must face it as it comes. I am glad that I am a Christian because I think that we actually find in our Christian faith certain hopes for the future, the thought of which eases what may be our present unhappiness. I wrote to someone the other day who had lost her husband - I think, in this case, it was Kitty Royal - and pointed out that those who believe in the Christian faith have a future which was expressed by the Gallilean long ago: "In my Father's house are many mansions". Perhaps that daughter of yours will see her husband again some day.

I have seen Turner Joy on occasions but, I guess, he is in your area now. I congratulate him on his new assignment. He is a nice fellow and has done very well out here and well merits his new job. I am glad that officers who have had previous experience in combat and, in particular, with combat ships in the Pacific, are being put into that work.

As for myself, I have never been impressed too highly with some of the Amphibious Commands. Except in the very highest circles they

merely carry troops into an area, drop the troops, and then return home again, at the expiration of which they pin the DSMs on their mighty breasts and are very proud of themselves. Perhaps they should be, but you and I, having fought for two years at close quarters with the enemy, do not view with too much approval the prideful manner with which the Amphibious boys operate. I have a very high regard for men like Turner, Wilkerson, Barbey, Hill, and Connolly, but all of them had been fighting in serious combat long before they went into the Amphibious Command. I don't want you to think that I am too critical in this letter because I am not trying to be so. I am enthusiastic about everybody who is out here fighting this war, and I am very proud of the work of the Bombardment Groups, in particular, almost everywhere. Amphibious work requires a great deal of good planning, and I think that the bigger commands have done very well indeed. However, we all must have a laugh every now and then!

Write me soon, you old hunk! Best regards. As always,



R. W. BATES

Commodore Harvey E. Overesch, USN
Hawaiian Sea Frontier
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

0734